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 1 Telekom Malaysia   14   2   12 (5)  7
 2 Petronas Gas   8   1   7 (4)  3
 3 Axiata Group   9   1   8 (2)  6
 4 KLCCP Stapled   8   1   7 (3)  4
 5 Petronas Dagangan   8   1   7 (3)  4
 6 Tenaga Nasional   13   1   12 (4)  8
 7 British American  8*   3*   5 (2)  3 
  Tobacco (Malaysia)   
 8  MISC   9   1   8 (3)  5
 9 Petronas Chemicals  8   1   7 (3)  4 
  Group   
 10 DiGi.com   7  –     7 (4)  3
 11 Maxis   8   1   7 (3)  4
 12 Astro Malaysia Holdings   9   1   8 (4)  4
 13 Westport Holdings   12   2   10 (4)  6
 14 Sime Darby   13   1   12 (5)  7
 15 Kuala Lumpur Kepong   8   2   6 (1)  5
 16 Hap Seng Consolidated   9   3   6 (2)  4
 17 PPB Group   7   1   6 (3)  3
 18 IHH Healthcare   12   3   9 (5)  4
 19 IOI Corporation   8   3   5 (2)  3
 20 SapuraKencana  8 2 6 (2) 4
  Petroleum 
 21 Genting   7 2 5 (1) 4
 22 Genting Malaysia 9 2 7 (3) 6
 23 YTL Corporation 13 9 4 (0) 4
 24 Malayan Banking 10 1 9 (3) 6
 25 Public Bank 7 1 6 (2) 4
 26 RHB Bank 6 1 5 (2) 3
 27 CIMB Group Holdings 11 1 10 (4) 6
 28 AMMB Holdings 11 1 10 (5) 5
 29 Hong Leong Bank 8 1 7 (2) 5
 30 Hong Leong  6 1 5 (2) 3
  Financial Group 
TOTAL 274 51 223 137
 1  Malayan Banking   10   1   9 (3)  6
 2 Public Bank   7   1   6 (2)  4
 3 RHB Bank   6   1   5 (2)  3
 4  CIMB Group Holdings   11   1   10 (4)  6
 5 AMMB Holdings   11   1   10 (5)  5
 6 Hong Leong Bank   8   1   7 (2)  5
 7 Hong Leong  6   1   5 (2)  3 
  Financial Group   
 8 BIMB Holdings   8   –     8 (4)  4
 9 Alliance Financial Group   5   –     5 (2)  3
 10  Affin Holdings    11   –     11 (7)  4
 TOTAL   83   7   76  43
Source: Companies’ annual reports & Bursa Malaysia
Research by Mathenny K and Johnny Loh I Source: Companies’ annual reports & Bursa Malaysia
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* A new executive director, Ricardo Martin Guardo, will be appointed on Sept 1
Source: KPMG & Bursa Malaysia
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Non-independent
•  One who is not an executive director of 
a company or its subsidiaries; 
•  One who has not been an officer of 
the company within the last two years 
but it is all right if one has been a 
non-executive director; 
•  One who is not a major shareholder of 
the company; 
•  One who has not been engaged by the 
company to advise it; 
•  One should also not be a partner, 
director or major shareholder of a 
company or firm which provides the 
company with professional advisory 
services; 
•  However, one may be an independent 
director of the company or firm 
providing the professional advisory 
services; and 
•  One who has not been engaged in any 
transaction with the company under 
such circumstances as prescribed by 
Bursa.
•  One who is either the founder or 
co-founder of the company, but has 
taken a back seat after actively running 
the company and its subsidiaries for 
years;
•  One who is related to the founder, 
controlling shareholder or managing 
director of the company; and
•  One who is a representative of the 
substantial shareholder. 
– oversight role– active management
EARLY last month, Bank Negara Malaysia mandated that boards of banks have a majority of independent directors who should not serve for more than nine years. At last count, only five of the 10 listed banking groups 
have a majority of independent directors, and three have equal 
numbers of independent and non-independent ones. Of the 83 
directors, 43 or 52% were independent.   
So how do listed 
blue chips compare 
with the banking 
groups? 
Research by 
FocusM shows that 
20 of the boards 
of the 30 FBMCI 
companies have a 
majority of non-in-
dependent directors, and only 10 with 
more independent ones.
Overall, only 50%, or 137 of the 274 
directors, are independent. Broadly, 
51 (18.6%) are executive directors, 
mostly CEOs and managing directors, 
and 223 (81.4%) are non-executive 
directors who are either independent or 
non-independent.
Axiata Group Bhd and Genting Malay-
sia Bhd boast the highest percentage of 
independent directors with 66.7% (six 
independent directors in a nine-member 
board) among the blue chips.
The statistics appear to show that the 
30 blue-chip stocks pass with “flying col-
ours” with respect to Bursa Main Market’s 
listing requirements that a listed issuer 
must ensure at least two directors or at 
least one-third (whichever is higher) of its 
board comprise independent directors. 
A 10-year study (2005-15) by Mazmi 
Associates Sdn Bhd on listed companies 
shows a 7% increase in the number of 
independent directors, from 40% in 
2005 to 47% in 2015, compared with a 7% 
decline in non-independent ones, from 
60% to 53%.
That’s not too bad considering that of 
the more than 900 listed companies on 
Bursa Malaysia, only 47% have independ-
ent directors. Like banks, should listed 
companies be required to have a majority 
of independent directors?  
To be sure, there has been growing 
awareness and regulatory push for listed 
companies to be more independent. 
There has been some praiseworthy 
progress – albeit at snail’s pace – as the 
number of independent directors has 
been rising.
However, how “independent” these 
independent directors really are, is a 
bone of contention. Sceptics say since 
they are usually appointed by con-
trolling shareholders, they can’t be truly 
independent.
Custodian role
Independent directors have long been 
seen as saviours of many corporate 
governance problems. According to 
the Webster’s New World Finance and 
Investment Dictionary, “independence 
occurs when a board member has not 
However, if a non-executive 
director engages in constructive chal-
lenges in the boardroom, that is real 
independence. In the long run, such 
constructive dissent will lead to more 
effective decision-making.
Finding the middle path
In today’s competitive business envi-
ronment, the role of independent 
directors has become more challenging 
due to intense scrutiny from stakehold-
ers, greater demands imposed through 
regulatory requirements and an increase 
in overall complexity of the business 
environment.
An independent director is duty-
bound to protect the interest of the 
company, and at the same time exercise 
independent judgment on issues which 
may lead to competing interests. When 
faced with issues where the interests of 
the management or promoters are in 
conflict with those of minority share-
holders, an independent director’s 
decision is sought to reach a judgment 
without fear or favour.
“At the end of the day, independ-
ence is a state of mind,” Malaysian 
Directors Academy (Minda) executive 
director Datuk Abdul Aziz Abu Bakar 
tells FocusM. “We have to bear in mind 
that whatever that revolves around 
human relationships, one can rely only 
on the integrity of individuals who take 
on the role of directors to ensure they 
maintain clear separation and independ-
ent minds when performing their duties 
as directors.”
In his view, an effective board 
comprises a group of people with an 
appropriate skill matrix, knowledge and 
experience that fit into the organisation’s 
objectives and strategic goals.
“This should always be considered not 
only when looking for new appointments 
but also in the context of regular board 
evaluations. The minimum number of 
independent directors required should 
be one-third of the total board member-
ship to ensure it continues to be properly 
constituted to perform its oversight role.”
Putra Business School director 
(non-thesis programme) Dr Ahmed 
Razman Abdul Latiff believes an ideal 
executive director and independent 
director ratio should be 50-50. This is 
necessary to provide more clout for inde-
pendent directors “to subdue a powerful” 
chairman or CEO who might be able to 
dominate fellow executive directors.
“Even so, these independent directors 
might not be that independent if they are 
somehow related to the executive direc-
tors, not necessarily by family linkages 
but through past business activities or 
went to the same education institution 
and other cases of close relationships,” 
he tells FocusM. “Therefore they have 
to consider the personal ramifications if 
they decide to go against the CEO or the 
chairman’s wishes.”
Family-controlled boards
Malaysian Alliance of Corporate Direc-
tors (MACD) Paul W Chan says itemising 
a list of what could possibly compromise 
the state of independence as laid down 
by Bursa and Bank Negara Malaysia is 
a good beginning to ensure a tangible 
framework. 
“But it is far from perfect. A person 
could fulfil all the stated exclusions of 
independence, but if the appointee is 
easily coerced, submitted to, or is grossly 
influenced by certain obligations in the 
appointment, the status of ‘independ-
ence of mind’ could be compromised.
“That does not mean an independent 
director should always be a reflexive dis-
ruptor on every issue but have a healthy 
and constructive scepticism on signifi-
cant issues that are being deliberated.”
In family-controlled boards, Chan 
observes that the role of independent 
directors to remain totally independent 
can be quite challenging.
“If taken positively, input from a 
company outsider can be of strategic 
importance; taken with reservation, 
negatively or worse, with suspicion, the 
harmony of the board dynamics could 
be impaired,” says Chan, who is also 
executive member of the Global Network 
of Director Institutes – an organisation 
with a global membership of over 100,000 
directors and governance professionals.
An independent director is expected 
to exercise healthy scepticism and 
objectivity in board deliberations over 
management’s operations. However, 
in cases where unresolved discords 
emerge between the management and 
independent directors, who should take 
the lead to decide?  
“Obviously, the board as a whole,” 
argues Chan. “If, however, the manage-
ment has the support of the majority of 
the board or significant family sharehold-
ers, the independent director may not 
survive in the next re-election.”
Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (MICG) Datuk Yusli 
Mohammed Yusof feels it is a miscon-
ception among some quarters that the 
role of an independent director is to be 
a voice of dissent to second guess the 
management. 
“That’s wrong. To be a rubber stamp is 
not desirable, of course, but challenging 
management, requesting details and 
questioning assumptions are about facil-
itating a full and well-informed debate 
at the board,” he tells FocusM. “If done 
well, it is a role which can support the 
management and validate the strategies 
pursued by the company.”
In a situation where the majority vote 
is against the independent director, Yusli 
urges the latter to request his position be 
recorded in the board minutes. “Board 
decisions, even if by majority, are col-
lective,” he justifies. “If it’s a question 
of failure in fiduciary duty and the 
independent director took a different 
position from the rest of the board, then 
the minutes recording his position will 
be taken into account.”
Preserving ethical standards
Hence, leaders who serve on boards of 
listed companies should understand 
their roles in discharging their fiduciary 
duties, says Securities Industry Devel-
opment Corporation (SIDC) director 
(personal development) Salleh Hassan.
He says behavioural skills such as 
communication and negotiation are 
important. Independent directors should 
be mindful that if they fail to voice their 
concerns and/or fail to put on record 
their dissenting voices, they may be seen 
or be accused of failing to discharge their 
duties.
“There are serious consequences for 
these failures which invariably could 
affect their own reputation and standing,” 
been and is not currently employed 
by the company or its auditor and the 
board member’s employer doesn’t do a 
significant amount of business with the 
company”.
Nevertheless, there is no one-size-
fits-all definition of independence that 
can be applied to every company in all 
situations. After all, it’s rare to have a 
perfectly-independent board – one with a 
majority of outside directors who are not 
affiliated with its top executives or have 
minimal or no business dealings with the 
company to avoid potential conflicts of 
interests.
Even if a board is truly independ-
ent, sceptics doubt its effectiveness in 
raising the bar in corporate governance 
standards and establishing public trust, 
especially in championing the cause of 
minority shareholders.
As observed, board independence 
alone does not guarantee corporate suc-
cess as it is incapable of preventing some 
of the mismanagement and fraud that 
surfaced in recent corporate scandals.
Many promoters have brought in 
people whom they have known for a long 
time to their company boards. They are 
often expected to add value or toe the line 
without any constructive challenge.
 Continues next page
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What makes 
an effective 
independent 
director
FOR an independent director (ID) to be 
effective, certain elements are important, 
says Malaysian Directors Academy executive 
director Datuk Abdul Aziz Abu Bakar. They 
are:
 Perception about independence of 
directors among the promoters, includ-
ing family-owned businesses, public 
sector corporations and multi-national 
companies;
 The importance of understanding the 
concept of true independence and what 
it entails;
 Always seek measures to diversify the 
pool of IDs rather than lament on their 
non-availability;
 Empowering IDs to develop the ability to 
proactively assist management to make 
the right decisions;
 Ensure that IDs enhance their skills and 
competence through ongoing training 
and induction;
 Ensure that IDs’ remunerations are 
competitive; and
 Exercise supervisory oversight over the 
statutory compliances which are to be 
made by the organisation.
by Cheah Chor Sooi
Abdul Aziz says 
independent 
directors are 
expected 
to exercise 
independent 
judgment on issues 
which may bring 
upon competing 
interests
Yusli says independent directors must 
have their opposing views minuted
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Chan says it’s quite 
challenging for 
independent directors 
of family-controlled 
boards to remain 
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he cautions. “In light of the above, it is 
equally important to have a strong and 
competent company secretary to serve 
as the conscience of the board.”
Salleh feels it is therefore crucial to 
decide only after careful consideration 
of facts and views that are followed by 
robust deliberation. “Everyone in posi-
tion of leadership and decision-making 
will always be in a difficult predicament,” 
he says. “In fact, every decision could 
turn out to be good or bad.”
In the past, Bursa had taken action 
against independent directors for 
failing to discharge their duties. For 
instance, it fined Golden Plus Holdings 
Bhd RM3.25 mil this year for numerous 
financial reporting breaches and other 
breaches of the exchange’s listing rules. 
Among others, the company failed to 
issue its financial statements for the 
financial years ended Dec 31, 2010 to 
2014 and quarterly reports for financial 
years 2011 to 2014, within the stipulated 
timeframes.
Universiti Malaysia Pahang’s 
Post-graduate Studies Institute dean 
Prof Datuk Hasnah Haron calls on 
every board to formulate its own set of 
ethical standards and system of compli-
ance centred on the company’s code of 
conduct.
“These ethical standards must be 
endorsed by the board. Independent 
directors must ensure compliance by 
issuing a reminder at the beginning of 
each meeting that all decisions must 
comply with such ethical standards.”
Selecting right  
board members
To preserve board independence and 
safeguard independent directors from 
“the Sword of Damocles that hangs 
above their heads”, Minda’s Abdul Aziz 
proposes that independent directors be 
provided with liability insurance which 
indemnifies them from losses resulting 
from claims made against them in the 
course of discharging their duties on 
behalf of companies.
“Faced with heavier responsibilities 
and stringent regulatory requirements, 
Hasnah calls 
on every board 
to formulate 
its own set of 
ethical standards 
and system of 
compliance
they need the assurance of cover to 
help protect them against the financial 
burden of litigation, damage to their 
reputation and loss of personal assets,” 
he says. “It is recommended that inde-
pendent directors seek to be provided 
with this assurance prior to agreeing to 
serve – or continuing to serve – on the 
board.”
While some organisations offer 
their qualified independent director 
candidates to public-listed companies 
(PLCs), the latter must do their due dili-
gence based on their industries’ unique 
requirements, says MACD’s Chan.
“It is critically important the nom-
ination committee (NomCom) of the 
board has an effective due process to 
source and evaluate potential candidates 
to join the board,” stresses Chan. “Quite 
commonly, potential candidates are 
referred through informal networks of 
corporate, professional, civil service, 
family or friendly connections.”
While some PLCs adopt the process 
of mapping out the skill set matrix of 
their boards to assess gaps to be filled, 
others may engage search firms and their 
methodologies of selection, including 
psychometric assessments.
“That said, the NomCom is still 
responsible to clearly define the criteria 
and desirable attributes of potential 
candidates and justifies its recommen-
dations to the board,” Chan points out.
MICG’s Yusli says every company 
and candidate must answer two vital 
questions: the ability to fit in and how 
to add value. “Good companies value 
independence as it enriches boardroom 
debate…this doesn’t come from being a 
stranger, rather it comes from an attitude 
of mind,” adds the former Bursa CEO.
Heavy  
responsibilities
For now, the roles and responsibilities 
of independent directors are quite well 
defined in the regulatory frameworks of 
the Securities Commission, Bursa, Bank 
Negara and the Companies Commission 
Malaysia. The Malaysian Code on Cor-
porate Governance 2012 (MCCG 2012) 
and the updates to MCCG 2016 is poised 
to enhance the code on independent 
non-executive directors, among others. 
The Whistleblower Protection Act 
2010 (WPA 2010) is another legislation 
that the boards of PLCs can incorporate 
into their corporate governance frame-
works. Under the WPA 2010, a director 
may make a disclosure of improper con-
duct to any enforcement agency based 
on his reasonable belief that any person 
has engaged, is engaging or is preparing 
to engage in improper conduct, provided 
that such disclosure is not specifically 
prohibited by any written law.
“A disclosure of improper conduct 
can also be made although the person 
making the disclosure is not able to 
identify a particular person to which 
 From previous page
Overstaying 
one’s welcome
KPMG’S findings also reveal that 
non-executive directors on average 
served about seven years – 7.5 
years for independent non-execu-
tive directors (INEDs) and 6.5 years 
for non-independent non-executive 
directors.
An interesting finding is that 
about one third (33%) of independ-
ent directors, or close to 390, had 
served more than nine years.
An INED’s tenure can be a con-
troversial topic indeed. Why is there 
so much fuss to limit the tenure? 
Clearly, if regulators are seeking to 
bolster the independent element 
of company boards, something 
must have been lacking in the first 
place. This could be indicative of a 
lingering feeling that non-executive 
directors (NEDs) – both independ-
ent and non-independent – may 
not be carrying their weight and 
see their board positions as “just a 
reward” at the end of a long career. 
On the other hand, empirical 
evidence gleaned from interactions 
with high-performing NEDs over 
the years indicates that tenure 
isn’t necessarily the best indicator 
of an NED’s independence and 
behaviour. After all, an NED could 
be non-performing from the first 
day of his appointment!
Salleh says 
decisions 
must be based 
on careful 
consideration 
followed 
by robust 
deliberation
Ahmed Razman says an ideal executive 
director and independent director ratio 
should be 50-50
Time to 
step down
IT’S common to hear about underper-
forming employees being counselled 
out of companies, but how does one 
approach the more delicate situation 
involving a director?
A study by KPMG’s Audit Committee 
Institute entitled Non-Executive Direc-
tors 2013: Profile and Pay suggests a 
director could be considered under-
performing when he:
 Has overcommitted himself to other 
directorships, his personal affairs 
and business, or both (thus, he is 
unable to devote the time required 
to serve effectively on the board and 
usually turns up for board meetings 
underprepared);
 Cannot or does not want to keep up 
with current issues confronting the 
company; and
Define clearly criteria and 
attributes of candidates
 Is painfully unaware of his roles, 
duties, rights and obligations; and/or 
is literally a silent attendee at board 
meetings.
While some companies impose term 
limits to ease directors out of office, 
there are two disadvantages – this 
can either be an extremely slow way 
to remove directors or increase the 
likelihood of removing high-performing 
ones.
Hence, boards may want to consider 
the following options:
 Agree on minimum performance 
standards required of each director 
(namely, roles and responsibilities 
which could be written in the direc-
tor’s appointment letter/service 
contract);
 Agree on a process to handle 
situations when a director may be 
required to leave on the basis of 
non-performance; and
 Have a succession plan in place not 
only for chairman and committee 
chairmen, but also for all directors 
(this would signal that a director’s 
position is not permanent).
the disclosure relates, and even when 
the improper conduct has occurred 
before the commencement of the WPA 
2010,” explains Putra Business School’s 
Dr Ahmed Razman.
Additionally, the proposed Corpo-
rate Liability Act – when passed – will 
pile more responsibilities on boards to 
include ensuring, among others, appro-
priate systems and processes are in place 
to check and deter unethical practices of 
corruption and bribery across the boards 
and companies.
Thrown into the mix is the required 
disclosure of Sustainability Statement in 
the Annual Report of PLCs with market 
capitalisation of over RM2 bil effective 
Dec 31, in addition to the proposed 
implementation of Integrated Reporting 
which demands both increasing respon-
sibilities and personal liabilities on the 
part of independent directors.
“If the existing regulations are not 
challenging enough, there are very few 
avenues for independent non-executive 
directors (INEDs) who uphold their 
independence with integrity to be pro-
tected,” reminds MACD’s Chan.  
“If an INED feels being coerced 
against his/her better judgment, integ-
rity, objectivity or independence, the 
consideration to resign from the board is 
clearly not an unreasonable option given 
the heavy legal and personal liabilities.” 
